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ABSTRACT 
Explorative R&D  collaboration is  an  important alternative  for  the internal  development of 
new  technologies.  The  high  failure  rate  of this  type  of inter-organizational  collaboration, 
however,  indicates  that  governing  explorative  R&D  collaboration  is  not  a  straightforward 
task. Moreover, we argue that different theoretical perspectives have formulated contradictory 
advice of how to  govern explorative R&D collaboration.  Given high risks  of opportunistic 
behavior and high coordination costs within explorative R&D collaboration, Transaction Cost 
Economics and Organization Theory emphasize the need for formal governance mechanisms. 
The innovation literature, however, stresses that formal governance mechanisms prohibit the 
carrying out of explorative activities which are necessary to  develop new technologies.  We 
also suggest two alternatives to address these paradoxical requirements. In specific, we argue 
that effective and efficient governance of explorative R&D collaboration can be achieved by 
1)  collecting second-hand information about potential partners, allowing for the substitution 
of formal  governance  by  relational  governance,  and  2)  combining  formal  and  relational 
governance mechanisms. Based on these theoretical findings, we emphasize the importance of 
longitudinal,  multi-level  research  to  study  the  characteristics  and  dynamics  of different 
governance mechanisms within inter-organizational collaboration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Historically,  market  alliances  have  generally  been  the  most  widespread  form  of inter-
organizational  collaboration  (Harrigan,  1986).  However,  since  the  late  1980s  most  of the 
initiated inter-organizational collaborations have a substantial technological content and even 
a specific R&D focus as inter-organizational collaboration has been identified as a useful tool 
to develop  new technologies (Doz & Hamel,  1997;  Doz & Williamson,  2002;  Hagedoorn, 
2002;  Wheelwright  &  Clark,  1992).  In  specific,  inter-organizational  collaboration  is 
considered to  be  an alternative for  the internal development of new technologies because it 
can both reduce the economic risks associated with the development of new technologies and 
increase the pool of diverse resources, needed to introduce new technologies successfully. 
Despite these potential advantages,  inter-organizational collaboration may encounter 
two particular problems, threatening successful collaboration within such innovative settings. 
First, according to Transaction Cost Theory (TCE) (e.g. Pisano, 1990; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; 
Williamson, 1991), inter-organizational collaboration used to develop new technologies faces 
substantial risks of opportunistic behavior. Second, researchers, looking from an Organization 
Theory  (OT)  perspective  (e.g.  Dekker,  2003;  Gulati  &  Singh,  1998),  argue  that  the 
completion of technological  complex  tasks  will  cause  coordination problems  between  the 
partners. According to both TCE en OT, these problems can be  dealt with by implementing 
formal  governance  mechanisms  such  as  contractual  obligations  and  formal  organizational 
mechanisms (Dekker, 2003; Poppo & Zenger, 2002;  Williamson,  1991).  After all,  formally 
governing the inter-organizational relationship triggers processes of formal control and formal 
* Working paper is accepted at the 2004 Academy of  Management Conference, New Orleans, August 6-11. 
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coordination,  minimizing  the  perceived  risk  of  opportunistic  behavior  and  costs  of 
coordination. 
While  formal  governance  mechanisms  are  being  advised  from  a  TCE  and  OT 
perspective, this advice can be questioned when considering the innovation literature. Several 
innovation researchers (e.g. Ahuja & Lampeli, 2001; Burgelman, 1983; Lant & Mezias, 1990) 
have argued that developing new technologies requires specific activities such as  searching 
for  new landscapes,  risk  taking  and  experimentation.  Given  the  need  of such  explorative 
activities, the question arises to  what extent formal governance mechanisms are appropriate 
means to manage  inter-organizational collaboration that aims  to  develop  new technologies. 
The reliance on formal control and formal coordination seems to  contradict the nature of the 
activities needed for  innovation.  In  this  paper,  it  is  our aim to  develop  insights  about this 
conflictual tension between formal governance structures on the one hand and the creation of 
a relational field in which explorative activities can be conducted on the other hand. Through 
confronting  the  literature  on  inter-organizational  collaboration  and  the  literature  on 
innovation,  we  will  identify the paradoxical  requirements  that  have  been formulated  with 
regard to governing inter-organizational collaboration used to develop new technologies. 
While the theoretical perspectives of TCE and OT versus those of innovation seem to 
formulate  contradictory advice of how to  manage explorative R&D collaboration, empirical 
evidence  of  successful  inter-organizational  collaboration,  applied  to  develop  new 
technologies,  is  present.  Studying  the  start-ups'  performance  in  Canadian  biotechnology, 
Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman (2000) came to the conclusion that alliance networks form a 
locus  of innovation in  high-technology fields.  Similarly,  Shan,  Walker,  and  Kogut (1994) 
showed that  the  number  of agreements  with  commercial  firms  has  a  positive  significant 
influence on the amount of  patents issued by biopharmaceutical start-ups. The cross-sectional 
research of Tether (2002)  indicated that  organizations,  who  were  between  1994  and  1996 
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engaged in at least one innovative oriented inter-organizational collaboration project, had a 
significantly higher probability of introducing within this same period at least one innovation 
that was new to  the market -signaling the presence of new technologies-, than organizations 
who  did  not  collaborate  at  all  during  this  period.  Although  these  studies  indicate  the 
possibility  of  inter-organizational  collaboration  to  achieve  the  development  of  new 
technologies, they do  not provide an answer on how this  inter-organizational collaboration 
can  be  governed.  In  specific,  it  remains  unclear  how  problems  of  coordination  and 
oppOliunistic  behavior  can  be  addressed  without  limiting  the  possibility  to  conduct 
explorative activities, needed to develop new technologies. Therefore, the second purpose of 
this paper is to suggest alternative governance strategies that are able to address problems of 
opportunistic behavior and coordination without prohibiting the carrying out of explorative 
activities, necessary to develop new technologies. These alternatives include the avoidance of 
formalization through collecting second hand information about potential partners as  well as 
the combination of  formal and relational governance mechanisms. 
Within this paper, we refer to  inter-organizational collaboration used to  develop new 
technologies as  'explorative R&D collaboration'. We use the concept of exploration because, 
as  already  mentioned,  developing  new  technologies  - i.e.  developing  a  technology  that 
incorporates knowledge that is clearly distinctive from the organization's existing knowledge 
base  - requires  explorative  activities.  By  referring  to  R&D  collaboration,  we  want  to 
emphasize that, within this paper, technologically oriented collaborations are considered. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we will explain why, according to TeE and OT, 
explorative  R&D  collaboration  requires  formal  governance  mechanisms.  Second,  we  will 
argue that, according to the innovation literature, formal governance mechanisms prohibit the 
development of new technologies within inter-organizational  collaboration.  Third,  we  will 
suggest alternative solutions that allow for  efficient and effective governance of explorative 
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R&D collaboration. To conclude, we formulate implications of our theoretical arguments for 
future  research  and  link  our  theoretical  insights  to  the  central  conference  theme  about 
'actionable knowledge'. 
GOVERNING EXPLORATIVE R&D COLLABORATION: 
APPL  YING A TCE AND OT PERSPECTIVE 
Studies  on inter-organizational  collaboration  (e.g.  Bleeke  &  Ernst,  1993;  Harrigan,  1988) 
indicate  that  success  rates  of inter-organizational  collaboration  are  low,  with  estimates 
suggesting that as many as  60  per cent of all inter-firm collaborations fail.  Next to  reasons 
that  are  external  to  the  collaboration, two  reasons,  specific  to  the  collaboration itself,  are 
identified to explain this high failure rate. First, according to Transaction Cost researchers, the 
risk of opportunistic behavior will be high within inter-organizational collaboration. Second, 
according to  Organization Theory researchers, achieving coordinated action will be  difficult 
when independent organizations collaborate. In this section, we will discuss these problems 
within the setting of explorative R&D collaboration and indicate how, according to TCE and 
OT, these problems can be minimized. 
The Risk of Opportunistic Behavior 
According  to  Williamson  (1991:  271),  "hybrid  modes  of contracting  are  supported  by 
neoclassical contract law". In other words, within inter-organizational collaboration it will be 
impossible to predict all possible contingencies affecting the collaboration. Therefore, inter-
organizational collaboration is  characterized by inherently incomplete contracts (Baum et aI., 
2000;  Luo,  2002).  The  use  of incomplete  contracts  increases  the  risk  of opportunistic 
behavior,  or  'seeking  self  interest  with  guile'  (Williamson,  1985).  Such  opportunistic 
behavior can  cause  that  an  organization  experiences  leakage  of proprietary  knowledge  to 
partners or losing control of important assets (Hamel, 1991; Williamson, 1991). This kind of 
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intra-collaboration  rivalry  retains  the  potential  to  severely  harm  a  paliicipating  firm. 
Therefore,  when  partners  expenence  a  high  risk  of opportunistic  behavior,  they  will  be 
hesitant to fully collaborate with the other partner(s), avoiding that these latter paliner(s) can 
abuse the collaboration for their own private benefit (Das & Teng, 2001;  Gulati, Khanna & 
nohria,  1994;  Nooteboom,  1996).  In  this  way,  the  risk  of 0ppoliunistic  behavior  severely 
limits the successfulness of inter-organizational collaboration. 
Not all  types  of inter-organizational  collaboration  will  be  confronted  to  the  same 
extent with the risk of oppoliunistic behavior. According to TCE scholars, three categories of 
exchange hazards, increasing the risk of  opportunistic behavior, can be identified within inter-
organizational collaboration: 1) asset specificity, 2) measurement problems and 3) uncertainty 
(Poppo & Zenger, 2002). We  expect that the occurrence of these different types of exchange 
hazards will be very probable within explorative R&D collaboration. First of all, explorative 
R&D collaboration often requires specific investments of different partners which can not be 
used for other purposes, increasing asset specificity of the transactions (Lambe & Spekman, 
1997).  Second,  within  such  innovation  projects,  performance  will  often  be  difficult  to 
measure. After all, potential returns on this kind of investment are often unclear or intangible 
(Van de Ven & Walker, 1984). Third, conditions of  uncertainty are the norm when it comes to 
developing  new  technologies  (Hill  &  Rothaermel,  2003).  Given  the  presence  of these 
exchange  hazards  we  can conclude  that,  following  a  Transaction  Cost  Economics  (TCE) 
logic, explorative R&D collaboration faces a substantial risk of  opportunistic behavior. 
Problems of  Achieving Coordinated Action 
While  researchers,  acting  from  a  TCE  perspective,  focus  on  problems  of opportunistic 
behavior  within  inter-organizational  collaboration,  researchers  applying  an  organization 
theory perspective (e.g. Doz, 1996; Gulati & Singh, 1998; Ring & Van de Ven,  1994), stress 
that  achieving  coordinated  action  between  different  paliners  is  difficult.  Doz  (1996),  for 
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example,  illustrates  how  a  strategic  alliance  between  a  small  entrepreneurial  and  a  large 
established pharmaceutical organization failed  because  both partners  were  using  their  own 
organizational  routines  at  the  interface  between  them,  often  with  poody  understood 
consequences such as conflicts, tensions, and people opting out of  the relationship. 
According to Gulati and Singh (1998), the task characteristics of  the collaboration will 
determine the extent to which coordination is problematic. In specific, following Thompson 
(1967),  they  argue  that  the  amount  of coordination  costs  is  dependent  on  "the  level  of 
interdependence that is necessary for the alliance partners to complete tasks" (Gulati & Singh, 
1998: 784). Moreover, taking into account that joint development brings along high levels of 
task interdependence, Gulati and Singh (1998) propose that collaborations with a substantial 
technological component experience high coordination costs. In this way, we can expect that 
coordination within explorative R&D collaboration will be problematic. 
Formal Governance Mechanisms to  Address Problems of Opportunistic Behavior and 
Coordination 
The  literature  on  inter-organizational  collaboration  not  only  has  identified  problems 
threatening  efficient  and  effective  inter-organizational  collaboration,  it  also  has  provided 
solutions  to  deal  with these problems.  In  specific,  researchers,  both  from  a  TCE  and  OT 
perspective, have stated that formal governance mechanisms should be implemented to reduce 
as well the risk of opportunistic behavior as  problems of coordination.  We  first  clarify the 
meaning of formal governance mechanisms and then argue why, according to TCE and OT, 
implementing a formal  governance structure minimizes risks of opportunistic behavior and 
problems of  coordination. 
Formal  governance  mechanisms.  Governance  mechanisms  are  "structural 
arrangements deployed to determine and influence what organizational members do" (Fryxell, 
Dooley & Vryza, 2002:  868).  According to Dekker (2003), formal governance mechanisms 
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consist of 1)  contractual obligations  and 2)  formal  organizational mechanisms.  Contractual 
obligations  represent  promises  or  obligations  to  perform  particular  actions  in  the  fLiture 
(Macneil,  1978).  The more  contractual obligations codified within the  formal  contract, the 
greater  is  the  specification  of promises,  obligations,  and  processes  for  dispute  resolution 
(Poppo  &  Zenger,  2002).  Gulati  and  Singh  (1998),  on  the  other  hand,  identified  five 
important types of organizational or hierarchical control mechanisms that are frequently used 
in  inter-organizational  collaborations:  1)  command  structures  and  authority  systems,  2) 
incentive systems, 3) standard operating procedures, 4) dispute resolution procedures, and 5) 
non-market pricing-systems  1.  The more  formal  organizational mechanisms  are  present, the 
greater is the reliance on formal social-psychological processes during the collaboration (Ring 
&  Van de Ven, 1994) 
The advantages of formal governance mechanisms. Both TCE and OT argue that 
implementing formal governance mechanisms will have a positive influence on the efficiency 
and  effectiveness  of inter-organizational  collaboration.  First  of all,  implementing  formal 
governance  mechanisms  triggers  formal  control  processes  (Fryxell  et  al.,  2002).  Formal 
control emphasizes the establishment and utilization of formal rules, procedures, and policies 
to  monitor  and  reward  desirable  performance  (Das  &  Teng,  2001).  According  to  TCE 
scholars (e.g. Oxley, 1997; Pisano, 1990; Willimason, 1985), formal control makes it possible 
to  deal with problems of opportunistic behavior. In specific, formal control allows aligning 
incentives of the different partners and provides monitoring of behavior and/or outcomes of 
the collaboration (Williamson, 1975, 1985). In this way, formal control may help to 1) ensure 
that partners make efficient ex ante investments and 2) reduce ex post bargaining and hold up 
threats.  Therefore, following TCE, we can expect that implementation of formal governance 
mechanisms  significantly  reduces  the  risk  of  opportunistic  behavior  within  inter-
organizational relationships (Deeds &  Hill, 1998). 
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While  TCE  researchers  focus  on  the  control  function  of  formal  governance 
mechanisms,  researchers,  looking  from  an  OT  perspective  (e.g.  Dekker,  2003;  Gulati  & 
Singh,  1998),  have  stressed  that  these  mechanisms  also  facilitate  coordination  between 
partners.  By clearly stipulating the  obligations and responsibilities of the  different partners 
within the formal contract, tasks of  partners, relationships between partners and boundaries on 
decisions  and  activities  are  extensively  specified  (Klein  Woolthuis,  Hildebrand  & 
Nooteboom, 2002). Moreover, formal organizational mechanisms such as standard operating 
procedures,  command  structures,  and  authority  systems  typically  include  planning,  rules, 
procedures, and programs (Gulati &  Singh,  1998). According to  Pondy (1977), all of these 
serve  the  common  purpose  of minimizing  communication,  simplifying  decision  making, 
reducing uncertainty about future tasks, and preventing disputes. In other words, formalized 
coordination (i.e. coordination that relies on formal control mechanisms) "makes the division 
of labor and the interactions between partners more predictable and allows joint decisions to 
be made more by rules than by exception" (Gulati &  Singh, 1998: 786). In this way, ongoing 
task coordination will be facilitated (Galbraith, 1977; March &  Simon, 1958). 
In conclusion, implementing formal governance mechanisms allows dealing with both 
problems  of coordination  and  risks  of opportunistic  behavior  within  inter-organizational 
collaboration. Therefore, following both TCE and QT, we propose: 
Proposition  1:  Formal  governance  mechanisms  reduce  the  risk  of opportunistic 
behavior and coordination within explorative R&D collaboration. 
GOVERNING EXPLORATIVE R&D COLLABORATION: 
AN INNOVATION PERSPECTIVE 
Explorative R&D collaboration, bringing together R&D people from  different organizations 
to  search  for  new  technological  trajectories,  has  been  recognized  as  a  powerful  tool  to 
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accelerate the development of new technologies (Doz & Hamel,  1997; Doz & Williamson, 
2002;  Wneelwright  &  Clark,  1992).  The  advantages  of  usmg  inter-organizational 
collaboration  to  develop  new  technologies  are  multiple.  First  of all,  inter-organizational 
collaboration  allows  spreading  the  costs  of  R&D  activities  over  different  partners 
(Hagedoorn,  1993;  Harrigan,  1986;  Veugelers,  1998).  In this  way,  the  economic  risks  of 
developing new technologies are reduced for each organization, stimulating organizations to 
engage  in  such innovation projects.  Second,  R&D  collaboration allows  for  the  transfer  of 
knowledge, facilitating cross-feliilization (Doz & Williamson, 2002).  Moreover, because of 
the close interaction during inter-organizational collaboration, not only the knowledge itself, 
but also  the competencies in  which this knowledge is  embedded can be  shared (Roberts  & 
Berry, 1985). In this way, inter-organizational collaboration seems to be the appropriate tool 
to assemble a large pool of  different but complementary knowledge. 
However, developing new technologies is  not a straightforward task.  In this  section, 
based on the innovation literature, we will argue that developing new technologies requires 
specific  activities  such  as  searching for  new  landscapes,  risk  taking  and  experimentation. 
Next, we will illustrate that, to  conduct these activities, a specific relational field  has to  be 
present  characterized  by  heterogeneity,  task  conflict,  and  redefining  existing  identities. 
Finally, we will assess whether formal governance mechanisms, implemented to  reduce the 
risk of opportunistic behavior and problems of coordination, also suppOli a relational field in 
which explorative activities can be conducted. 
The Need for Exploration. 
According to the innovation literature (e.g. Ahuja & Lampeli; 2001; Burgelman, 1983; Lant 
& Mezias,  1990), developing new technologies requires activities such as  searching for new 
landscapes, taking risks and conducting experiments.  Organizational learning theorists (e.g. 
Holmqvist, 2003; Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991) have referred to these activities as 
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activities  of exploration.  Conducting  exploration  provides  the  organization  with  multiple 
benefits from the  perspective of developing new technologies.  First of all,  exploration can 
increase  an  organization's  problem-solving  arsenal  (Amabile,  1988).  These  alternative 
problem-solving strategies  can bring along new insights in  how emerging problems can be 
tackled, stimulating the development of new tedmologies. Second, explorative activities such 
as experimentation have been recognized as the only viable way to generate information with 
regard  to  problems,  characterized  by  the  absence  of a  cause-and-effect  understanding 
(McGrath, 2001; Makhija &  Ganesh,  1997). Because developing new technologies will often 
bring along such problems, exploration seems to be necessary. Finally, exploration will allow 
challenging  the  cognitive  structures  and  cause-effect  relationships  that  characterize  the 
established technologies  of the  organization  (Ahuja  &  Lampert,  2001).  In  this  way,  new 
insights can emerge, leading to the development of  new technologies. 
These  explorative  activities  have  to  be  clearly  distinguished  from  exploitative 
activities such as  refinement, standardization and systematic cost reduction (Koza &  Lewin, 
1998; March, 1991). Exploitation can bring along a sufficient amount of selection, needed to 
optimize existing technologies, but can not create enough variation, necessary to  cause the 
development of  new technologies (McGrath, 2001; Holmqvist, 2003). 
How to Conduct Exploration? 
We just illustrated why developing new technologies requires exploration2• According to Van 
Looy,  Debackere and Bouwen (2003), conducting exploration asks  for  a specific relational 
field  in  which  heterogeneity  is  present,  task  conflict  is  allowed,  and  redefining  existing 
identities is possible. We will now discuss this specific relational field more detailed. 
Heterogeneity  has  to  be  present.  Schon  (1963)  argued  that  novel  solutions  and 
insights  stem  from  problem-defining  and  problem-solving  interaction  sequences,  whereby 
multiple  opinions  and  viewpoints  become  integrated  into  a  new  synthesis  or  artifact. 
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Similarly,  Pelz  and  Andrews  (1966),  came  to  the  conclusion that  differences  between the 
scientist and hislher colleagues in their technical strategy or approach to work may provide 
the intellectual jostling or  'dither' which is  needed for  really creative work.  More recently, 
Argyres (1996) illustrated that strategies aimed at broadening (and exploring) technological 
capabilities require intensive inter-divisional collaboration. In this way, conducting activities 
such as  searching  for  new landscapes  and experimentation seems  to  imply  generating  and 
addressing differences in opinion and interpretation between the actors involved (Van Looy et 
aI.,  2003). In other words, heterogeneity of skills, knowledge and attitudes has to  be present 
when teams have to carry out explorative activities. 
Task  conflict  has  to  be  allowed.  The  presence  of heterogeneity  between  team 
members is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition to conduct explorative activities. Kuhn 
(1962)  already  came  to  conclusion  that,  when  different  communities  of practice  are 
confronted with each other, conflict will emerge. Therefore, Van Looy et ai.  (2003) argue that 
conflict and tensions are inherent dimensions of  exploration. 
According to  the  conflict  literature  (Guetzkow &  Gyr,  1954;  Jehn,  1995;  Priem & 
Price, 1991), a distinction has to be made between task and relationship conflict. Task conflict 
exists when there  are  disagreements  among  group  members  about the  content of the  tasks 
being  performed,  including  differences  in  viewpoints,  ideas,  and  opinions.  Relationship 
conflict exists when there are  interpersonal incompatibilities among group members, which 
typically includes tension, animosity, and annoyance among members within a group (Jehn, 
1995:  258).  While  relationship  conflict  has  been  identified  as  detrimental  for  all  kind  of 
groups (Jehn, 1995; Pelled, 1995), task related conflicts  seems to be beneficial for groups that 
have to conduct non-routine tasks such as explorative activities. After all, task related conflict 
brings along critical evaluation, increasing thoughtful consideration of alternative solutions, 
and encourages people to develop new ideas and approaches (Baron, 1991; Janis, 1982; Jehn, 
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1995; Simons &  Peterson, 2000). Moreover, group pressure toward agreement, leaving little 
room  for  task  conflict,  "can squelch  the  creativity  needed  to  complete  non-routine  tasks 
effectively,  because  members  will  focus  on  building  consensus  rather  then  enteliaining 
innovative  ideas"  (Jehn,  1995:  260).  Therefore,  when  exploration  is  needed,  task  conflict 
should be allowed to occur  (Van Looy et aI, 2003). 
De  Visch,  Wyns,  Bruyn,  and  Bouwen  (1988),  by  studying  different  innovation 
projects, have come up with two dialogue-strategies that allow handling task related conflicts 
within heterogeneous innovation teams without causing the  escalation of relational conflict: 
1) the 'musical chairs' strategy and 2) the merry-go-round strategy. Within the musical chairs 
strategy, the team shifts from one perspective to the other, by sequentially giving the floor to 
the different paliies. In this way, all pat1ies will be confronted in a systematic way with the 
different perspectives.  In the  merry-go-round  strategy,  on the  other  hand,  paliies  are  first 
stimulated to  address  different  perspectives  at  the  same  time.  Next,  parties  are  asked  to 
reframe their own perspective, taken into account the perspectives of  the other parties. 
Redefining existing identities has to be possible. Such dialogue-strategies, however, 
can  only  be  successful  when  individuals  are  able/willing  to  question  their  own  identity. 
According to the seminal work of  Argyris and Schon (1978), most of the time, organizational 
members are programmed to  "respond to changes in the internal and external environments 
of the organization by detecting errors which they then correct so as  to maintain the central 
features  of organizational  theory-in-use"  (Argyris  &  Schon,  1978:  18).  Moreover,  such  a 
single-loop  learning  system,  in  which  existing  identities  are  continuously  confirmed, 
programs people "to resist exploring issues that might surface threatening information and 
arouse  feelings"  (Argyris  &  Schon,  1978:  198).  Therefore,  Argyris  and  Schon (1978:  29) 
believe that changing existing theory-in-use requires double-loop learning in which "response 
to detected error takes the form of  joint inquiry into organizational norms themselves, so as to 
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resolve  their  inconsistency  and  make  the  new  norms  more  effectively  realizable".  More 
recently, Brown and Duguid (1991) propose that 'enacting organizations,3 must be capable of 
reconceiving not only its environment but also its own identity. Given these propositions, it is 
not surprising that Van Looy et al. (2003) stress that conducting explorative activities asks for 
a relational field in which existing identities can be questioned. 
Based  on  these  arguments,  we  can  conclude  that  exploration  indeed  asks  for  a 
relational field characterized by heterogeneity, task conflict, and redefining existing identities. 
We have to remark that, according to Van Looy et al.  (2003), such a relational field will be 
detrimental for  activities of a more exploitative nature.  In  these circumstances, a relational 
field  characterized  by homogeneity,  consensus,  and  confirming  existing  identities  will  be 
necessary. Therefore, following an innovation perspective, we propose: 
Proposition  2:  A  relational  field  characterized  by  heterogeneity,  task  conflict,  and 
redefining exisitng identities facilitates explorative activities, needed to  develop new 
technologies within explorative R&D collaboration. 
Do Formal Governance Mechanisms Facilitate Exploration? 
As  already  mentioned,  formal  governance  mechanisms  reduce  the  risk  of 0ppOliunistic 
behavior and problems of coordination within inter-organizational collaboration.  However, 
the question arises whether formal governance mechanisms also facilitate the development of 
new technologies? In  other words, are formal  governance mechanisms able to facilitate the 
carrying out of explorative activities? We will address this question from the perspective of 
the innovation literature. 
Implementing  formal  governance  mechanisms  allows  for  formal  control  and 
formalized  coordination.  Brown  (1983),  however,  argues  that  relying  on  over-organized 
interfaces (i.e.  interfaces between paliners characterized by clear goals and by well-defined 
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and enforced rules and procedures) limits the possibilities for  innovation.  Similarly, a large 
amount of innovation researchers (e.g.  Burns &  Stalker,  1961; Damanpour,  1991; Pierce & 
Delbecq, 1977) have come to the conclusion that formalization prevents innovative solutions. 
The  findings  of McGrath's  (2001)  study  of 56  new  business  development  projects  that 
innovation projects characterized by formal role and job definitions were less  effective than 
innovation projects in which role and job definitions were  less formalized are therefore not 
surpnsmg. 
Explanations,  indicating  why  formalization  limits  exploration,  are  also  numerous. 
According to  'The Simplified Merton Model' of March and Simon (1958:  41),  reliance on 
formalized  role behavior  brings  along  rigidity of behavior.  Stressing formal  roles  and job 
definitions discourages people to deviate from the expected behavior, making the occurrence 
of creativity very lmlikely.  Similarly, Kiesler and Sproull (1982) propose that explicit rules, 
procedures and programs narrow the field of search, create a frame  for  the interpretation of 
new information and  increase the  likelihood that data disconfirming the decision premises 
upon which the objectives were based will be ignored. More recently, Benner and Tushman 
(2003)  illustrated that formalized process management practices such as  ISO 9000 and Six 
Sigma push an organization for productivity leaving little room or slack for experimenting or 
pursuing novel ideas and concepts.  In  these circumstances, engineers and scientists become 
anxious to  conduct exploration because, compared to  returns from exploitation, returns from 
exploration are  systematically less  certain, more remote in time,  and organizationally more 
distant from  the  locus  of action (Katz &  Allen,  1985;  March,  1991).  To conclude,  formal 
governance mechanisms  suppOli  a  relational  field  characterized by  homogeneity,  avoiding 
task conflict, and confirming existing identities. As already mentioned, such a relational field 
can facilitate exploitation, but will prohibit exploration. Hence: 
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Proposition 3: Formal governance mechanisms prohibit the carrying out of  explorative 
activities within explorative R&D collaboration. 
HOW TO GOVERN EXPLORATIVE R&D: ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 
Several studies (e.g. Baum et ai., 2000; Couchman &  Fulop, 2001; Shan et ai.,  1994; Tether, 
2002) provide evidence of successful explorative R&D collaboration. However, these studies 
do  not  provide  an  answer  on  how  explorative  R&D  collaboration  has  to  be  governed. 
Moreover,  as  argued in the previous  sections,  looking  at different theoretical perspectives, 
paradoxical requirements are  being  formulated.  While  TCE and OT emphasize the  use  of 
formal governance mechanisms to deal with risks of 0ppOliunistic behavior and problems of 
coordination,  the  innovation  literature  argues  that  formal  governance  mechanisms  will 
prohibit the  carrying  out of explorative  activities,  necessary to  develop  new technologies. 
Therefore, the question arises of how to govern in such a way that explorative activities can 
be conducted while at the same time the risk of 0ppOliunistic behavior and coordination costs 
are being reduced.  In this section, we suggest alternative solutions to achieve efficient and 
effective  governance  of  explorative  R&D  collaboration.  First,  applying  a  structural 
sociological perspective, we discuss the alternative of collaborating with familiar  partners. 
Next,  we  suggest two  other  alternatives  that,  in  our  opinion,  can  facilitate  effective  and 
efficient governance of explorative R&D collaboration: 1) collecting second hand information 
about potential partners and 2) combining formal and relational governance. 
Collaborating with Familiar Partners. 
A  first  alternative  is  to  set up  a R&D  collaboration with familiar partners.  Until  now,  we 
implicitly  assumed  that  partners  did  not  have  a  history  of prior  interaction  when  the 
collaboration takes of.  However, researchers, applying a structural sociological perspective 
(e.g. Ahuja, 2000; Eisenhardt &  Schoonhoven, 1996; Granovetter,  1985; Gulati,  1995), have 
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stressed that organizations, which have a history of prior interaction, are likely to collaborate 
again in  the  future.  Moreover, when partners collaborated in  the past,  they  do  not feel  the 
need  to  extensively  formalize  the  collaboration.  Gulati  and  Singh  (1998),  for  example, 
showed that,  when prior ties were present, non-equity arrangements were chosen instead of 
equity arrangements, representing the absence of hierarchical control mechanisms. Similarly, 
Kogut, Shan, and Walker (1993) argue that when prior co llaboration is present, the need for 
well-specified  contracts  will  be  much  less  present.  We  now  consider  more  in-depth  this 
alternative strategy. First we clarify why collaboration with familiar partners as  well reduces 
the need for formal governance as increases the possibility to rely on relational governance. 
Next,  we  argue  that  relational  governance  facilitates  explorative  activities.  Finally,  we 
identify possible problems of collaborating with familiar partners with respect to developing 
new technologies. 
Collaboration  with  familiar  partners  reduces  need  for  formalization. 
Collaborating with familiar partners will reduce the need for  formalization for  two reasons. 
First of all, when partners have collaborated successfully in the past, trust or "a psychological 
state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the 
intentions  or  behavior of another" (Rousseau,  Sitkin,  Burt &  Camerer,  1998:  395)  will  be 
build  up  between the  partners  4•  In specific,  repeated  cycles  of exchange,  risk  taking,  and 
successful fulfillment of expectations will provide firsthand information about the extent to 
which the  other partner  is  indeed trustworthy,  leading  to  competence-based trust  (Das  & 
Teng, 2001; McAllister, 1995; Rousseau et at.,  1998). Moreover, next to providing firsthand 
knowledge about the partner's competences and intentions, repeated interactions can give rise 
to the emergence of a shared psychological identity, indicating the presence of shared norms, 
values and beliefs (Gaertner, Dovidio &  Bachman,  1996).  According to  researchers such as 
Parssons (1951) and Fukuyama (1995) positive expectations will arise when people share the 
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same  values  or  norms.  This  type  of  trust,  based  on  the  development  of  a  mutual 
understanding, has been called goodwill trust (Das & Teng, 2001; McAllister, 1995; Ring & 
Van de Ven, 1994). When, because of prior interactions, competence and goodwill trust are 
present,  the  perceived risk of 0ppoliunistic  behavior will  be  limited (Das  &  Teng,  2001; 
Nooteboom,  1996).  Therefore,  implementing formal  governance mechanisms to  reduce the 
risk of  0ppOliunistic behavior will not be necessary. 
Second, because of  the social structure of  prior interactions, firms may have developed 
routines together to enable ease in joint interaction with each other (Gulati &  Singh,  1998; 
Ring &  Van de  Ven,  1994).  In other words, prior interaction brings  along the creation of 
inter-organizational routines,  facilitating  coordination between the partners (Dyer &  Singh, 
1998). In this way, the occurrence of coordination problems will be less likely, reducing the 
need to implement formal governance mechanisms (Dekker, 2003; Gulati &  Singh, 1998). 
Collaboration  with  familiar  partners  stimulates  relational  governance.  The 
presence of trust and inter-organizational routines does not only reduce the need for formal 
governance mechanisms, but it also allows for an alternative way to govern the relationship 
between familiar partners.  In specific, governance can emerge from the  shared norms  and 
values  and  agreed-upon processes  embedded within  such  long-lasting  social  relationships 
(Deeds  &  Hill,  1998;  Poppo  &  Zenger,  2002).  Within  such  'relationally-governed' 
relationships, processes of control and coordination will differ from the  formal  control and 
coordination processes that characterize formally-governed inter-organizational relationships. 
When exchanges are reiationally-governed, divergence between different partners can 
be  minimized  by  referring  to  the  shared  norms,  values  and  routines  present,  instead  of 
emphasizing rules, procedures and policies (Eisenhardt, 1985, Ouchi, 1979). In other words, 
social control will substitute for formal control. 
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Moreover,  relational  govemance  brings  along  norms  of flexibility,  solidarity,  and 
information exchange (Poppo  &  Zenger, 2002).  In this way,  issues of coordination can be 
addressed, not by referring to  formalized rules and procedures, but by the simple process of 
real-time,  informal  communication.  In  this  way  coordination  by  mutual  adjustment  will 
replace  formalized  coordination.  (Mintzberg,  1979;  Poppo  &  Zenger,  2002;  Thompson, 
1967). 
Relational governance facilitates exploration. The substitution of  formal control and 
coordination by social control and coordination by mutual adjustment seems to be promising 
with respect to  carrying out explorative activities.  According to  Ouchi  (1980:  134),  social 
control allows carrying out tasks that are "highly unique, completely integrated, or ambiguous 
for other reasons". After all, compared to  bureaucratic (i.e.  formalized) structures, in  which 
surveillance, evaluation and direction are stressed, organizational structures characterized by 
social control, in which shared norms, values and routines are emphasized, much less restrict 
behavior of  individuals5• 
Also the substitution of  formalized coordination by coordination by mutual adjustment 
is  beneficial with respect to carrying out explorative activities.  According to  the innovation 
literature, coordination by mutual adjustment, characterized by excessive information sharing 
and informal communication, stimulates innovative solutions (Damanpour, 1991). In specific, 
excessive information exchange between communities-of-practice has been brought forward 
as  an essential  condition  for  innovation (Bouwen,  De  Visch  &  Steyaert,  1992;  Brown  & 
Duguid, 1991; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995; Cohen &  Levinthal, 1990). Excessive information 
exchange will  make heterogeneity  in  skills,  knowledge  and attitudes  between members of 
different  partners  explicit.  In  this  way,  cross-fertilization  of  ideas  becomes  possible, 
stimulating  creativity  and  questioning  existing  identities  (Aiken  &  Rage,  1971;  Weick  & 
Robel1s, 1992). Moreover, by relying on informal communication, differences of opinions can 
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be addressed openly (Deeds & Hill,  1998; Dougheliy, 1992, Pierce & Delbecq,  1977). This 
allows  handling task  conflict without  risking  an  escalation of relationship  conflict.  In this 
way,  compared  to  formal  governance,  relation  governance,  stimulating  social  control  and 
coordination by mutual adjustment, seems to support the carrying out of explorative activities. 
Problems  of collaborating  with  familiar  partners.  Despite  the  advantages  of 
collaborating with familiar paliners, this may not be a viable alternative for explorative R&D 
collaboration.  The  main  reason  is  that  dense  social  times  may  restrict  firms  from  new 
information and new opportunities (Gargiulo  & Benassi,  2000;  Rowley et at.,  2000;  Uzzi, 
1997). Organizations who collaborate repeatedly with each other, build up a large amount of 
domain similarity (i.e. organizations have the same services, clients, and personnel skills; Van 
de Ven & Walker,  1984: 601). In this way, firms, entering multiple collaborations over time 
with each other, will be confronted with "diminishing marginal increments of information" 
(Gulati,  1995:  626).  In  other  words,  collaborating  in  the  past  reduces  the  amount  of 
heterogeneity present between the partners. However, when the objective of the collaboration 
is  to  develop  new technologies through  conducting  explorative  activities,  heterogeneity  is 
necessary. Hence: 
Proposition 4:  Collaborating with familiar  partners,  although it  facilitates  relational 
governance, is not a viable option with respect explorative R&D collaboration because 
heterogeneity between the partners will be limited. 
Collecting Second Hand Information about Potential Partners. 
A second alternative strategy is to  collect second hand information about potential partners. 
This  strategy  is  formulated  following  trust  researchers,  (e.g.  Barber,  1983;  McKnight, 
Cummings & Chervany, 1998) who argue that credible secondhand information regarding the 
intentions or competence of potential pminers can bring along positive expectations, leading 
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to  trust.  Such  credible  information  about  the  trustee  may  be  provided  by  others  (e.g. 
reputation) or by certification (e.g. a diploma) (Rousseau et ai.,  1998). These "proof sources" 
signal that the trustee's claims of trustworthiness are  true'.  Meyerson,  Weick,  and Kramer 
(1996) have referred to this type of trust, which relies on the reputation of the other involved 
people and on category-driven information-processing such as unit grouping and stereotyping, 
as  'swift trust'. Moreover, they stated that, within temporary systems, such trust is  a useful 
alternative for  formal governance mechanisms to  reduce the perceived risk of 0ppoliunistic 
behavior. 
We also expect that, when, by collecting reliable secondhand information, a competent 
partner can be chosen, coordination problems are  reduced.  After all,  it  seems probable that 
working with a competent partner on complex and uncertain tasks requires less coordination 
to  achieve  similar  results  as  compared  to  when  working  with  a  less  competent  partner 
(Dekker, 2003). 
Therefore,  we  argue  that  collecting  secondhand  information  about  potential  partners 
reduces  problems  of opportunistic  behavior  and  coordination,  making  formal  governance 
mechanisms redundant. In this way, from the beginning of  the collaboration, partners can aim 
for  relational governance by relying on relational governance mechanisms instead of formal 
governance  mechanisms.  Das  and  Teng  (2001)  identified  two  relational  governance 
mechanisms  that  can  be  used  within  inter-organizational  collaboration:  1)  participatory 
decision-making and 2) cultural activities such as rituals, ceremonies, and networking6• These 
relational  governance  mechanisms  foster  processes  of socialization  and joint sense making 
(Ring &  Van de Ven,  1994). The occurrence of these social-psychological processes makes 
the achievement of shared values, beliefs and routines more likely (Fryxell et aI.,  2002). In 
this way, collaboration can rely on relational governance instead of  formal governance. 
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To conclude, collecting second hand information about potential partners reduces the 
need for  formalization by building up  swift trust and increasing the probability of finding a 
competent patiner. In this way, relational governance mechanisms can be stressed within the 
collaboration,  stimulating the  creation of shared norms,  values  and  beliefs.  As  mentioned 
before, relational governance, by  triggering processes of social control and coordination by 
mutual adjustment, stimulates the carrying out of explorative activities. Moreover, opposite to 
the option of collaborating with familiar patiners, collecting secondhand information does not 
reduce heterogeneity between the paliners. Therefore, we propose: 
Proposition  5:  Collecting  second  hand  information  about  potential  partners,  by 
stimulating  relational  governance  without  reducing  heterogeneity  between  the 
partners,  allows  for  effective  and  efficient  governance  of  explorative  R&D 
collaboration. 
Combining Formal and Relational Governance. 
A third and final strategy of governing explorative R&D collaboration is  to combine formal 
and relational  governance.  Until  now we  have  argued that  relational  governance  becomes 
possible when the need for formal governance is reduced. This corresponds to  a vast amount 
of literature in which formal  and relational governance are  seen as  substitutes (e.g.  Arrow, 
1974;  Gulati,  1995;  Larson,  1992;  Macaulay,  1963;  MalhOlia  &  Murnighan,  2002).  First, 
according to these researchers, relational governance lowers transaction costs and facilitates 
adaptive responses, making formal  governance obsolete. Larson (1992), for  example, found 
out that,  when informal  social  controls  were  present,  formal  controls  were  pushed to  the 
background. Second, these researchers argue that, when formal governance is emphasized, the 
formation  of relational  governance  will  be  undermined.  By  conducting  experiments, 
MalhOlia and Murnighan (2002) provided evidence that, when formal  contracts are present, 
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individuals  are  not  able  to  make  personal  attributions  to  the  collaboration,  limiting  the 
development of interpersonal trust.  Similarly, Macaulay (1963:  64) argued that the presence 
of carefully planned contracts 'indicates a lack of trust and blunts the demands of friendship, 
turning a cooperative venture into an antagonistic horse trade'. 
However,  Poppo  and  Zenger  (2002)  found  evidence,  indicating  that  formal  and 
relational  governance  mechanisms  can be  complements  instead  of substitutes.  In  specific, 
they  found  out that  1)  contract complexity,  indicating the  presence of formal  governance, 
increases relational governance, which in turn increases exchange performance and 2) greater 
relational  governance  appears  to  positively  affect  contractual  complexity,  which  in  turn 
increases exchange performance. These findings suppott the argument of Macneil (1978) that 
relational  governance  becomes  a  necessary  complement  to  the  adaptive  limits  of formal 
contracts by fostering continuance and bilateralism when change and conflict arise. Moreover, 
these results indicate that contracts, that shift from merely specifying deliverable outcomes to 
providing  frameworks  for  bilateral  adjustments  may  facilitate  the  evolution  of highly 
cooperative exchange relations (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2002; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). 
The  idea  that  formal  and  relational  governance  can  be  complements  instead  of 
substitutes is also reflected in the seminal paper of  Ring and Van de Ven (1994). In this paper, 
Ring and Van de  Ven (1994:  112) argue that "cooperative inter-organizational relationships 
are maintained, because they create balance: balance between formal and informal processes." 
This quote indicates that,  combining formal  and relational governance, instead of choosing 
between these two options, seems to be a promising alternative to govern inter-organizational 
relationships.  However,  Ring  and  Van de  Ven (1994)  did  not really provide guidelines  to 
achieve and maintain such a combination.  We will here  suggest how formal  and relational 
governance can be combined and argue that such a combination is patticularly of interest to 
explorative R&D collaboration. 
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Couchman and Fulop (2001) studied the successful collaboration between two public 
research  agencies  and  one  private  company,  bringing  along  the  development  of a  new 
technology, allowing for the development of a commercially-viable contact lens which could 
be  worn continuously for  a period of up  to  one month.  From the  beginning,  the  task  and 
relational  characteristics of this  collaboration were  extensively formalized.  Couchman  and 
Fulop  (2001:  22)  themselves  talk  about  a  'disciplined  approach'  with  regard  to  the 
organization and management of the project. In specific, the existence of a contract book - a 
document which defined in detail the  project goals and the plan of action to  achieve these 
goals  - were  mentioned  as  one  of the  major  factors,  guaranteeing  that  the  collaboration 
project was "put on a sound footing" (Couchman &  Fulop, 2001:  22).  However, at the same 
time,  a  secure computer network was  installed, weekly teleconference  meetings  were  held 
among the different teams,  and 6-monthly face-to-face project review meetings  were held. 
According to Couchman and Fulop (2001: 25), these three communication media "contributed 
to  the intensity of communication and to  overall team-building, and helped to  maintain the 
project energy." 
Similarly,  Brown  and  Eisenhardt  (1997:  28),  by  studying  the  computer  industry, 
showed  that  some  organizations  applied  semi-structures,  "in  which  some  features  are 
prescribed  or  determined  (e.g.  responsibilities,  project  priorities,  time  intervals  between 
projects),  but other aspects are  not (e.g.  design process,  communication)".  Moreover, they 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  organizations,  which  applied  semi-structures,  representing  a 
balance between mechanistic and organic organizational structures, were the most performant 
in terms of innovation. 
These [mdings suggest that combinations of formal and relational governance seem to 
be  possible.  Moreover,  taken  into  account  the  specific  innovative  context  in  which these 
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studies were  conducted,  these  solutions seem to  be  paliicularly valuable within  im10vative 
settings where exploration is needed. Hence: 
Proposition 5:  Combining formal and relational governance allows for  effective and 
efficient governance of explorative R&D collaboration. 
CONCLUSION 
Inter-organizational collaboration is  an important alternative for the internal development of 
new  technologies.  However,  governing  explorative  R&D  collaboration  seems  to  be 
problematic. While TCE and OT emphasize the need for  formal governance mechanisms to 
reduce the risks of 0ppoliunistic behavior and problems of coordination within explorative 
R&D  collaboration,  the  innovation  literature  stresses  that  formal  governance  mechanisms 
prohibit  the  carrying  out  of explorative  activities  which  are  necessary  to  develop  new 
technologies. Given this paradoxical situation we have suggested two alternative solutions to 
achieve effective and efficient governance within explorative R&D:  collecting second hand 
information  about  potential  partners  and  combining  formal  and  relational  governance 
mechanisms.  Empirical validation of these  two  strategies,  however,  is  limited.  It remains 
unclear, for instance, what type of  coordination and control will be triggered when formal and 
relational  governance  mechanisms  are  combined.  Moreover,  research  that  has  considered 
some of these  alternatives  sometimes comes to  surprising conclusions.  Dekker (2003),  for 
example,  by  studying  817  transactions  between  buyers  and  suppliers  of  information 
technology products and services, found out that intensive partner selection efforts (i.e. efforts 
to  build  up  second-hand  knowledge  based  trust)  brought  along  more  instead  of less 
formalization.  Therefore,  further  research  assessing  these  alternative  solutions  within  the 
context of inter-organizational collaboration seems to be necessary. 
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Suggestions for Further Research 
In  our  opinion,  two  limitations  of existing  research,  focusing  on  governance  of inter-
organizational  collaboration,  have  to  be  overcome.  First  of all,  within  existing  research, 
governance structures are most of the time considered to  be  a static phenomenon. However, 
Reuer, Zollo, and Singh (2002), studying collaborations in the biotechnology industry, found 
that forty percent of the collaborations examined changed their initial governance structure. 
Moreover,  Ring  and  Van de  Ven (1994) propose that  it  could  be  beneficial  within  inter-
organizational relationships to  change the governance structure during the  collaboration.  In 
specific, they propose that, during the initial stages of the collaboration, collaboration should 
rely on formal governance. Later on, relational governance should gradually be introduced to 
avoid over-formalization.  Similarly, Fryxell et  al.  (2002) provided evidence that new joint 
ventures,  which  apply  formal  governance  mechanisms,  perform  better  than  new  joint 
ventures, which do not formalize extensively in the beginning. At the same time, they found 
out that older joint ventures, which are relationally-governed, perform better than older joint 
ventures which rely on formal governance. These results indicate that looking at the dynamics 
of inter-organizational governance is an important issue.  In other words, we do  not have to 
answer  'What governance mechanisms have to  be  implemented?', but rather have to  assess 
'When should we implement which governance mechanisms?'. Longitudinal or retrospective 
research seems to be necessary in this respect. 
In  this  research  domain,  people  have  focused  on  the  management  level  of the 
collaboration. Alliance managers, who are responsible for the strategic and tactical aspects of 
the collaboration, have been used as key informants for studies examining inter-organizational 
collaboration (Currall & Inkpen,  2000).  The team members, entrusted with the operational 
activities of  the collaboration, have been much less involved in this kind of  research (Oliver & 
Roos,  2002).  We  assume  that,  especially  within  explorative  R&D  collaborations,  these 
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operational team members (i.e. R&D personnel of the different partners) will determine to  a 
iarge  extent  the  successfuiness  of the  collaboration.  After  all,  these  peopie  win  have  to 
conduct the explorative activities, necessary to bring along new technologies. Therefore, we 
argue  that,  when  we  want  to  understand the  conditions  for  successful  inter-organizational 
collaboration,  which  aims  for  developing  new technologies,  it  is  impotiant to  assess  both 
management and operational levels. 
Epilogue: Implications for Creating Actionable Knowledge 
This paper on explorative R&D collaboration might bear specific relevance to the conference 
theme 'actionable knowledge'. While the knowledge gap  between scholars and practitioners 
has been a continuous concern of  the Academy of  Management, the theme of  this year reflects 
the growing awareness for this lasting challenge. Bridging different types of knowledge is a 
way to frame the issue of creating actionable knowledge. Bridging knowledge might even be 
considered as a condition sine qua non to arrive at actionable - i.e. implemented - knowledge. 
Inter-organizational  collaboration within the  context of innovation  can  be  considered as  a 
specific, highly informative, case in this respect (see special issue on 'Bridging the Relevance 
Gap'  in  British  Journal  of Management,  2001).  Inter-organizational  collaboration  indeed 
concerns collaboration between heterogeneous actors facing the  challenge of creating novel 
approaches  that  work.  Our  preliminary  conclusions  suggest  the  importance  of a  creative 
combination of formal as  well as relational governance practices on different levels in order 
for  this  heterogeneity  or  diversity  to  result  in  actionable  terms.  Brown &  Duguid (1991) 
stressed  the  importance  of communities  of practice  for  intra-organizational  innovation 
projects. They also favor a knowledge-as-participation metaphor instead of a knowledge-as-
substance  metaphor to  understand how researchers  and technicians  exchange findings  and 
develop new ideas in informal dialogues around specific technical problems. The challenge 
for  inter-organizational  collaboration,  between  industrial  patiners  as  well  as  between 
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academic  and  industrial  partners,  can  probably  better  be  understood  by  looking  into  the 
characteristics  of the  governance  practices  to  span  or  bridge  knowledge  communities.  By 
engaging in common practices actors can enact the formal and relational govemance activities 
that allow the  bridging of the knowledge gaps present.  Getting a deeper insight in how to 
develop  such  govemance  activities  effectively,  pertains  directly  to  how  we  conceive 
knowledge; not only as  an asset that can be traded but also as  a common practice that can be 
enacted. In our further research we will focus on moments of  interfacing that allow successful 
collaborations to translate into concrete, actionable, results. 
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ENDNOTES 
1.  These  formal  organizational  mechanisms  also  can  be  codified  within  the  inter-
organizational  contract.  In  this  way,  formal  organizational  mechanisms  also  become 
contractual obligations, increasing the specificity of  the contract. 
2.  In this paper we stress that developing new technologies requires exploration.  However, 
sometimes also exploitative activities are needed within such innovation projects. Moreover, 
we acknowledge that also within innovation projects, aiming for the optimization of existing 
technologies, exploration can be necessary. Nevertheless, following the innovation literature, 
we  assume  that  the  amount  of exploration will  be  significantly  higher  within  innovation 
projects, aiming for the development of new technologies than within innovation projects that 
focus  on  improving  existing  technologies.  Exploitation,  on  the  other  hand,  will  be 
predominant within the latter type of  innovation projects. 
3.  Brown and Duguid (1991:  179) define the enacting organization as "proactive and highly 
interpretive. Not only does it respond to its environment, but also, in a fundamental way, it 
creates many of the conditions to which it must respond." In this way, exploration will be of 
main importance within such organizations. 
4.  Although, according to the defmition of  Rousseau et al. (1998), trust ultimately reside with 
individuals,  a  large  amount  of researchers  (e.g.  Currell  &  Inkpen,  2000;  Gulati  &  Singh, 
1998;  Tomkins,  2001;  Zaheer  et aI.,  2002)  have  argued that the  concept of trust  is  also 
applicable on an inter-firm level. 
5.  However, when social control becomes so strong that existing  norms, values and routines 
can  not  be  questioned  any  more,  conducting  explorative  activities  will  also  become 
problematic. After all, the more these shared norms and values are stressed, the more difficult 
it  will  be  for  individuals  to  deviate  from  these  shared norms  and values  (Christensen  & 
Overdorf, 2000; Van Looy et aI., 2003). In these circumstances, reframing existing identities 
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will become extremely difficult, prohibiting exploration.  Nevertheless, following researchers 
such  as  Katz  and  Allen  (1982),  March (1991)  and  Nooteboom (1996),  the  occurrence  of 
exaggerated social  control can be avoided by  maintaining a moderate amount of employee 
turnover within the collaborative team. 
6.  A large amount of researchers (e.g.  Arrow,  1974; Dyer &  Singh,  1998; Poppo &  Zenger, 
2002; Ring &  Van de  Ven,  1992) also have identified trust as  a social control mechanisms. 
However, following researchers such as  Currall and Inkpen (2000), Das and Teng (1998) and 
Rousseau et al.  (1998) we want to apply a clear distinction between trust (i.e. a psychological 
state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the 
intentions  or  behavior of another,  Rousseau et  aI.,  1998, p.  395) and control  mechanisms 
(structural arrangements deployed to  determine and influence what organizational members 
do,  Fryxell  et  aI.,  2002,  p.868).  In this  way,  the  risk  of 'concept  stretching'  is  avoided 
(Osigweh, 1989). 
42 